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The result of the elections last Sunday was no lightning on a clear day. A diffuse but pervasive social unrest had been installed in society in step with the general crisis of capitalism, the economic restrictions imposed by the depletion of the commodity boom on Argentina and the persistent media offensive aimed at destabilizing the government. It was, therefore, only a matter of time before this situation was expressed in the electoral arena. So the groundbreaking mandatory open primary elections held Aug. 9 should have raised the alarm, but the results were not analyzed by the ruling party with the rigor required by the circumstances. An attitude prevailed, which could benevolently be qualified as "denial," thanks to which self-criticism and the possibility of introducing corrective measures were absent, with the consequences being those we are now lamenting.
In this brief analysis, I will stick to a few aspects related to the strategy and tactics that the Front for Victory, or FpV, adopted in the last few months. I will leave for now the assessment of the whole Kirchnerist experience and its multiple contradictions: universal child benefits and support for businesses; extension of the retirement system and regressive taxation; scientific and technological development and “soy-ization” of agriculture; foreign policy oriented toward Latin America and an economy opened up to foreign [capital] ... Nor will I refer to an arc of time that transcends the current electoral conjuncture, for instance, the striking inability to build a political subject and transform “United and Organized” into a true and ally and plural force, and not an empty shell whose only mission was to support, without any real efficacy, the government’s policies. Nor the appalling inability to prepare, after 12 years in power, an alternate leadership to that of Daniel Scioli, a politician plucked from (former President Carlos) Menem’s kidney. Nor the suicidal attitude, used up until a few months ago, of discrediting and even ridiculing he who was, in the end, the only candidate the Kirchnerismo could rely on, when the difficult presidential succession was at stake. In other words, they repeatedly slammed — without holding back any type of insults and humiliations and amid the joyful befuddlement of the lapdogs of power — the one figure who turned out to be the only card they could count on, without realizing, before shamefully hanging on to him later, in a desperate attempt to save “the project.” I leave it to the readers’ imagination what to call this attitude.
More recently, various mistakes in the political strategy have been made, with enormous repercussions: first, the decision not to support Martin Lousteau’s candidacy as Buenos Aires City mayor against Horacio Rodriguez Larreta, whose successor (Mauricio Macri) now seems the probable executioner of Kirchnerism. If (Kirchnerism) had left aside its absurd fundamentalism, (Macri’s predecessor) would have lost Buenos Aires City and it would have inflicted a lethal, or at least devastating blow to the (current) presidential candidacy of Mauricio Macri. But the FpV’s befuddlement, from the presidency to the ultimate party member, was a blessing for the right, allowing it to maintain its power on Buenos Aires City and save the future of its main political swordsman. Few cases of political blindness can match this one.
We have a regional responsibility that we cannot shirk: a victory by Macri would be a mortal blow...
But the path of mistakes did not stop here. In a bid to save the ideological purity of the Kirchnerist formula, and before the mistrust Daniel Scioli and his sinuous political trajectory raised, there was no better idea than appointing Carlos Zannini as candidate for the vice presidency. Choosing the presidency’s legal and technical secretary became a “pure Kirchnerist” formula, good enough to appease the anxiety of their own, but incapable of winning votes beyond the political universe of Kirchnerism. This decision completely passed up every basic rule taught in electoral sociology: that in order to obtain a majority, it is recommended to present a political offer able to attract not only the voters already convinced (the core nucleus of a political party), but also the voters who may be convinced for other reasons (rejecting the anti-Kirchnerist forces, opportunistic calculate or inclination to vote for the winner, among others.) But the Scioli-Zannini formula closed all these doors, as last Sunday proved, and remained cloistered to the Kirchnerist vote, significant but insufficient to obtain the difference that would have avoided the feared runoff vote.
Another unexplainable error added to all this: the stubbornness to propose Anibal Fernandez, head of Cristina Fernandez’ cabinet, as a candidate for governor of Buenos Aires province, the mother of all political battles in Argentina as it contains almost 38 percent of the country’s voters. He was victim of a durable and immoral smear campaign, converting him into the person with the most negative image in the province. In spite of this, his candidacy was obstinately maintained, only representing (FPV members), and completely losing sight of the complex electoral panorama of the province. The result was a crushing defeat in favor of the opposition candidate, Maria Eugenia Vidal, who completely lacked of experience in this district — she seconded Mauricio Macri as the vice head of government of Buenos Aires City. To be fair, responsibilities were shared in this defeat: Fernandez’ negative image, combined with Scioli’s poor management of the province. If it had been somewhat better, Vidal would not have been able to take over the government. For instance, instead of equipping the province with the much-advertised 85,000 new policemen, the outgoing governor had appointed just as many teachers, the result would have certainly been different. In any case, it is still hard to understand such a pernicious and costly obstination to support Fernandez’ candidacy in these circumstances.
Finally, another mistake was the decision to have Scioli unfold a campaign in which he would seem like Cristina as much as possible, with the exclusive defense of her presidential management as a central axis, without any projection to the future. Against those who proposed change as a slogan — like the right-wing alliance’s name “Let’s change” (Cambiemos), or against someone like Macri, who praised in a demagogical way the “revolution of joy,” Scioli appeared as a sad and hesitant candidate, on the defensive, and historically mistreated by the president and by her court, debilitated by the criticism he received from the Casa Rosada (presidential palace), by the Campora (Kirchnerist political group, part of “United and Organized”) and by the Carta Abierta (group of Kirchnerist intellectuals). Condemned to relentlessly defend the project without the slightest possibility of alluding to the changes it needs, like holistic tax reform, the nationalization of foreign trade and a heterodoxical anti-inflation policy against inflation that would prevent the liquefaction of a not-so-inconsiderable part of the substantial social investment the government of Cristina Fernandez. The results are there for all to see.
No one who genuinely identifies as being on the political Left will be able to distractedly contemplate a Macri victory...
There are other issues to point out, like his refusal to debate with the other presidential candidates, which further reduced his approval among the population, and his opportunistic announcement at the last minute of doubling the salary minimum for income tax, something the national government should have done a long time ago. In any case, it would seem that certain changes brought about in Argentine social structure and in the prevailing cultural climate in the country, strongly semanticized by the media terrorism unleashed by the right — changes made precisely thanks to the social inclusion policies of the government of Cristina Fernandez — did not work to give greater sustainability to the project, in fact the opposite is true, in line with the tendencies already seen in countries such as Brazil, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela, that they would have been missed in Argentina is incomprehensible. The popular sectors that have improved their socioeconomic and cultural situation thanks to the actions of progressive and left governments do not necessarily reward them with their vote, and in Argentina last Sunday that was very telling. For a long time we have been warning that, with a lack of a systemic effort of consciousness-raising and ideological formation — the revered “battle of ideas” of Fidel Castro — the boom in consumption does not create political hegemony but instead serves to increase the membership of right-wing parties.
Given the above, to reverse what happened in the first round of elections seems a very difficult challenge, though not an impossible one. It must be attempted to prevent Argentina from becoming the spearhead of a process that could, this time, be the beginning of the “end of the cycle” of progressive governments in the region, something that, a few days ago, seemed unlikely. As a matter of fact, if the candidate of Kirchnerism is defeated at the ballot box it would mark the first time that a progressive or leftist government has been defeated at the polls since the inaugural triumph of Hugo Chavez in December 1998. Until now, all of those governments have been ratified at the polls and it would be lamentable if Argentina were to break with that positive tendency. We have a regional responsibility that we cannot shirk: a victory by Macri would be a mortal blow against UNASUR, CELAC, and even Mercosur. Also, Argentina would re-align itself unconditionally with the empire and that would make it redouble its efforts in its offensive against the Bolivarian governments, which keep losing external support.
As a Latin American and a Marxist I cannot be indifferent in the face of the threat that a Marci government represents, which would immediately unite Argentina with Alvaro Uribe, Jose M. Aznar and their North American mentors in their persistent crusade to eradicate Chavismo and the governments of Evo and Correa from the face of the earth in order to foster the “change of regime” in Cuba. Which is to say, definitively liquidate any sign of anti-imperialism in Latin America. No one who genuinely identifies as being on the political Left will be able to distractedly contemplate this possibility nor absolve themselves of the task of confronting it with all their strength. Unfortunately, we have come to this point, we do not have any option other than to support the Front for Victory to prevent the risk of a greater evil, knowing that that if we manage to triumph in this task we will have to give ourselves the immediate task of building a true leftist political alternative, because Kirchnerism, with its successes, its errors, its ideological limitations, is not it and cannot be it.
Can Scioli defeat his opponent at the ballot box? That depends on how he designs his campaign strategy for these coming weeks. The debates with Macri can be the key to victory, if he is capable of moving onto the offensive and to demonstrate that his opponent, behind his vague discourse, hides a brutal austerity program. But that will not be enough. He will also need to stop confining his discourse to a defense of Kirchnerism (something Cristina Fernandez does not need help with as she does it infinitely better than he), he must define new priorities and come out with concrete proposals in economic, social, cultural, and international topics that will allow him to convince the public that he can be the president that can begin to do everything that Kircherism, in other moments, recognized needed to still be done and has not done. And that he says it with conviction, without asking anyone's permission and without waiting for the affectionate tap of approval from the Casa Rosada. It is a difficult task, but not impossible. Before him does not stand De Gaulle or Churchill, instead he faces a bland product of astute political marketing, supported by the publicity apparatus of the imperial right. Difficult, I repeat, but far from impossible. Hopefully he will do well because, although some deny it, in this election the future of the emancipatory processes and the anti-imperialist struggles in Latin America is at stake.
This article was translated from the Spanish. Read the original here.
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