Nicaragua's Elections and the US’ 'Color Revolution'

The so-called color revolutions or soft coups are today one of the silent intervention strategies employed by the United States, with the purpose of overthrowing governments contrary to its economic, political, social and military vision.

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One of the most recent cases against Nicaragua is the suspension of hundreds of accounts of journalists and activists in favor of the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) in the social networks Facebook, Instagram and Twitter, less than a week before the general elections.

The censorship campaign also swept media outlets advocating a leftist media agenda from digital platforms, representing another of the actions taken by U.S. Presidents Donald Trump and current President Joe Biden after the failed coup attempt in 2018. 

Later came the closure of profiles with thousands of followers belonging to large and influential media within the country.

For Uruguayan political analyst, based in Managua, Jorge Capelán, Washington has used all methods of destabilization in the Central American nation, and since the very triumph of the Sandinista Revolution in 1979 it has financed a counterrevolutionary paramilitary force.

“During 10 years, the deaths as a consequence of that confrontation are estimated at over 50,000. The so-called contras tortured, burned cooperatives, attacked health posts and blew up bridges, but they were never able to establish a beachhead in national territory,” he told Prensa Latina.

In the end, they had to sit down to dialogue with the government headed by Daniel Ortega and accept elections within the constitutional framework. However, for the 1990 elections, the United States allocated huge amounts of money to support the opposition to the FSLN.

In addition to the economic funding, the U.S. exerted pressure on the citizens with the purpose of achieving an unfavorable vote against the FSLN. They promised the end of the conflict and that election meant the beginning of “the long neoliberal night," which translated into 16 years of plundering and privatization.

The U.S. ambassadors in Nicaragua have always assumed an aggressive posture since the arrival of Ortega to the presidency, Capelán recognized, among them, Paul Trivelli and his successor Roberto Callahan.

“However, each of those diplomats wore down until, under the presidency of Barack Obama, Laura F. Dogu arrived in the country in September 2015. This official, contrary to her predecessors, “maintained her willingness to work with the people and the government of Nicaragua,” he stressed.

In Capelán's opinion, the preparation of the 2018 coup attempt was already “under the table” with an “enveloping strategy.” While she served as a diplomat, they infiltrated institutions and trained young people from private universities in courses linked to, for example, community development.

“In those study programs they taught them how to subvert the country through social networks, the creation of media, the management of numerous digital platforms and under the facade of a supposed social work, they kept bank accounts for their activation when the time came," he indicated.

Capelán recalled that, on that occasion, they promoted a state of opinion unfavorable to institutions such as the National Police or the Sandinista Youth. They offered no support or evidence of any kind for their claims, and then came the whole campaign related to the fires in the Indio Maíz Reserve, the second most relevant in Nicaragua. 

“It was then when they undertook a media crusade about an alleged government operation in that region, they brought out totally disproportionate versions of the fact, and then they even discovered that the fire had been arson,” he considered.

On April 16, 2018, Ortega announced measures aimed at increasing the contribution of workers and employers to social security and the creation of a special tax on pensions of 5%; the following day the Twitter account, @SOSINSS, announced an alleged murder of a young man employed in the local economy.

From that moment on, the calls for protests in different cities against the reforms increased. According to some academics, the attackers of spaces such as the University Center of Leon “were turned into fascists and skillfully manipulated for acts of violence and hatred."

The Sandinista president then decided to postpone the reform of the Nicaraguan Social Security Institute, apparently one of the triggers of the protests, and the following week sectors of society began a series of demonstrations in favor of the FSLN government.

The "tranquistas" -the promoters of the blockades in towns and cities-, according to Capelán, did not succeed in economically suffocating the country. A few weeks later the National Police intervened in the lifting of the barricades and, little by little, the Sandinistas regained control of the streets.